Against the position of professor rex martin ("the review of metaphysics," xxv, December 1971) it is argued that there is a conceptual link between disobedience and destruction of authority, As socrates argues; that socrates does not take obedience to law to be an absolute principle of action; that socrates in the two dialogues about his trial does not contradict himself on the question of obedience to the court; that socrates' argument from piety does not undermine his arguments from injury and (...) agreement. (shrink)

Engelhardt is correct in thinking that potentiality implies continuity. The central purpose of the Aristotelian notion of potency is to explain continuity, both in becoming and in generation-corruption. If one denies continuity in change, he will have little use for potentiality, at least little use for the Aristotelian types. And there are types that should not be conflated: one to account for continuity in becoming and generation, another to account for continuity of a being going from not acting to acting. (...) The first type, where something happens to a being, is called passive potency; the second type, where a being itself actively does something, is predictably called active potency. (shrink)

The general plan of the volume is this: 1) an introductory essay argues that it is the task of the philosopher to define the nature of human freedom; 2) the philosophers take over and consider the metaphysics of freedom, freedom of thought, and the acts of freedom; 3) following the distinction between individual and social freedom, external or social freedom is considered in its relation to government, to law, to international society, to economic systems, to labor, to education, and to (...) the expression of the beautiful; 4) finally, religious freedom, both individual and social, rounds out the volume. As this plan indicates, the fourteen essays are intended to form a whole, with philosophy supplying the unifying principles. The introductory essay, by W. E. Carlo, concludes. (shrink)

Before we take up the arguments directly, there is one general point about Socrates' position that he considered essential to everything he said in the Crito. Also, he thought that this point was easily missed. He calls it his "starting point." It is that "we ought neither to requite wrong with wrong nor to do evil to anyone, no matter what he may have done to us." And Socrates warns Crito not to accept this position too quickly or without full (...) consideration, "for I know that there are few who believe or ever will believe this". Yet this moral principle is so essential to his arguments that "those who believe this, and those who do not, have no common ground of discussion, but they must necessarily, in view of their opinions, despise one another". This position, never to harm others in any circumstance, is "the starting point of our discussion...". (shrink)

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We propose a generalization of expected utility that we call generalized EU (GEU), where a decision maker’s beliefs are represented by plausibility measures and the decision maker’s tastes are represented by general (i.e., not necessarily real-valued) utility functions. We show that every agent, “rational” or not, can be modeled as a GEU maximizer. We then show that we can customize GEU by selectively imposing just the constraints we want. In particular, we show how each of Savage’s postulates corresponds to constraints (...) on GEU. (shrink)

This is a clearly reasoned presentation of moral theory for a moderate position that permits early and excludes late abortion. He argues that only some form of utilitarianism can supply a deep moral theory for a moderate position on abortion.